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JUDICIAL TECHNIQUES IN COMBATING TAX
AVOIDANCE

Ralph S. Rice*

T

is no problem today more fundamental in federal tax law
than the rationale (or lack of it) that underlies the conduct of the
courts in striking down tax avoidance devices and refusing to recognize
business arrangements which meet statutory requirements for tax saving but exude an odor piscatorial.
The cases in the area are, of course, legion. Some arrangement of
transactions so as to achieve maximum tax advantages has always been
approved; these are the cases involving so-called tax "avoidance"
rather than "evasion." This may be illustrated by the case in which a
taxpayer obtains a maximum tax deduction by making desirable but
not imperative repairs to business property in a high income year.
Likewise, to prevent bunching of income, he may bill or collect accounts
for services in a low income year. Or in order to obtain advantage of
the capital gains provisions of the statute, he may hold a capital asset
past the six month period before sale. Tax saving is the obvious purpose and effect of the method selected to consummate the transaction
in all of these cases, but traditionally this has been thought to furnish
no occasion for imposing a tax otherwise inappropriate.
Not all cases, however, are this clear. There is, for example, the
Twin Oaks case, in which three stockholders owned all the stock in
Supply Company. In 1941, just prior to the adoption of the federal
excess profits tax, they set up a partnership in which the wife of one
was included. The company assigned all of its property, except some
real estate, to the partnership in exchange for a· note and assumption
of its corporate liabilities. The effect of the transaction was to divert
to the partnership substantial income which would otherwise be taxed
at high rates as income of Supply Company. The Tax Court held that
the transaction was a sham and that the partnership income should be
taxed to the corporation. The Ninth Circuit reversed because such a
decision "denied the taxpayers the legal right to conduct their business
affairs through a medium of their own choice."1 This may be conHERE

"" Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.-Ed.
Twin Oaks Co. v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 385 at 387. This
case is, of course, only illustrative of the many continually appearing in which ingenuity
of taxpayers is pitted against resourcefulness of the Bureau. For example, taxpayers are
avidly exploring the tax saving possibilities in sale or other transfer and lease back arrangel
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trasted with the troubles of Guy Earl, who sought to avoid taxes on
his own earnings by reliance on an agreement which he claimed
assigned his earnings to Mrs. Earl before he received them. In his
case the Supreme Court concluded that these fruits could not be
"attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew."2
The disparity in these results presents a familiar dilemma of the
courts in interpretation of the federal income tax laws. Presumably,
in these cases as in many others, the courts were equally challenged
by the unadorned terms of the statute which required exemption, and
an unmistakable attempt to save taxes through reliance on formal
distinctions. Essentially, the problem faced by the court involves
neither semantics nor dialectics, however frequently- these appear in
the decisions.
It is, of course, trite to say that the income tax statutes of necessity
fail to provide specifically and unmistakably for all contingencies in
which transactions may properly be taxable. Prescience of statutory
draftsmen and members of Congress is limited, and it may not be
assumed that Congress could foresee all transactions possible and
agree upon a line of demarcation between the taxability of each. Even
were Congress so supernally endowed, language expressing the distinction would lead to a statute so complex that by comparison the
present Code would be rudimentary. The need for simplicity thus
forces Congress to accept a calculated risk of tax avoidance.
ments, and a pattern is currently emerging in the cases. May Dept. Stores Co., 16 T.C.
547 (1951); Shaffer Terminals, Inc., 16 T.C. 44 (1951); Standard Envelope Mfg. Co., 15
T.C. 41 (1950); Helen C. Brown, 12 T.C. 1095 (1949); Catherine G. Armston, 12 T.C.
539 (1949); Ingle Coal Co., 10 T.C. 1199 (1948); Buffalo Meter Co., 10 T.C. 83 (1948).
It is not the purpose of these comments, however, to trace intensively the treatment of tax
avoidance in a limited area but rather to consider underlying judicial philosophies. The
problem previously has been examined from the point of view of the taxpayer as contrasted
with the point of view of the court. See Ballantine, "Psychological Bases for Tax Liability,"
27 HARV. Bus. RBv. 200 (1949); Angell, "Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance," 38 CoL. L.
RBv. 80 (1938); Paul, "Restatement of Tax Avoidance" in STIIDms IN FEDERAL TAXATION
(1937).
For other somewhat startling successful tax avoidance practices encompassed in boudoir
transactions, see Dorzback v. Collision, (3d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 69, and Newberry's
Estate v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1953) 201 F. (2d) 874 at 878. In the latter case it was
said: ''We have no doubt that the parties, advised by counsel deliberately chose the alternative which appeared to entail the less burdensome tax consequences. But tax saving motivation does not justify the taxing authorities or the courts in nullifying, or disregarding, the
taxpayer's otherwise proper and bona fide choice among courses of action." No suggestion
is made respecting the standard by which a transaction is measured to determine whether it
is "bona fide."
2 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 at 115, 50 S.Ct. 241 (1930). For a more recent frustration of an attempt to attribute fruits to a tree other than that on which they grew, see
Byers v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 273.
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It likewise is inevitable that taxpayers will sometimes avoid taxes
by tendering purely formal compliance with statutory requirements
as a justification for nontaxability. The basis for their success is
reasonably apparent: there are obvious reasons why a statute should be
considered to mean no more and no less than it says. To abandon
the moorings established through the statutory structure might "create
difficulties and uncertainties more objectionable in their results than
any seeming inequities which would be eliminated or prevented."3
Tax consequences may determine not only how but whether many
business transactions of a nature vital to national economic well being
will be consummated. Such transactions may be impeded or altogether
foregone where tax consequences are governed by a statute which is
continually extended to mean something other than what it says.
While the effects of such uncertainty can be, and indeed have been,
overstated,4 the argument is not without force. Even beyond the
economic need for certainty, it is at least doubtful how far judicial legislation should go as a matter of self-imposed restraint of the members
of the courts. For if the courts extend the plain provisions of the Code,
relying on the vague contours of statutory "policy" requirements which
exist only in the hearts and minds of the jurists, we may well be coming
uncomfortably close to judicial absolutism.
The alternative is no less distressful. When one taxpayer effects a
transaction with only literal conformance to the statute and thereby
contrives to avoid tax, the damage is not measured solely in terms of
the dollar loss of revenue under his own return. Success in one transaction emboldens attempts in others, and the taxpayer, as with all
successful men, will have his imitators. Thus there is always the danger
that the good fortune of the taxpayer in a single case will be the fountainhead from which will spring multiple transactions in which tax
avoidance is the sole, or primary, or contributing purpose. Were only
strict adherence to statutory exclusions required to evade taxability, tax
administration might soon be bogged down by tax avoidance devices far
beyond those currently plaguing the Commissioner and the courts. Yet
this is only the beginning of the embarrassment. The only sound basis

3

Eaton v. White, (1st Cir. 1934) 70 F. (2d) 449 at 452.
See Spear, "'Corporate Business Purpose' in Reorganization," 3 TAX L. REv. 225
(1947). For other general observations on the subject see the text material supra note I,
and Lourie, "The Business Purpose Doctrine," 25 TAXES 800 (1947); Flack, "Where Tax
Saving is Behind Business Purpose," 23 TAXES 910 (1945).
4
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for tax collection lies in the conviction of the people that the tax burden
is in general fairly apportioned. The loopholes opened where exemption is approved upon formalistic compliance with statutory requirements invites disillusion with tax administration as well as emulation of
the successful taxpayer. Such disillusion eventually may become manifested in concerted taxpayer resistance with disastrous results to the
federal treasury.
Thus, the manner in which the lines are drawn between successful
a:rid unsuccessful tax avoidance devices becomes critical in tax administration. Three primary questions are presented:
(a) Is there a measurable pattern running through the tax
avoidance decisions?
(b) If no pattern now exists, must we conclude that no measurable pattern is possible?
(c) To the extent that any pattern exists, what is its current
scope and formY

The Judicial Confession of Defeat
It is not an overstatement to say that in no area of law has there
been more fumbling in the circuit courts and below than here. Typical
is one opinion in which a taxpayer unsuccessfully sought to arrange a
transaction so that what would normally be ordinary income would be
taxed to him as capital gain. The obvious issue was control of tax
avoidance. The court first acknowledged the difficulty of establishing
rational standards for measuring tax liability:
"In tax litigation perhaps more frequently than in the mill-run
of other types of justiciable controversy, cases adduced by advocates or revealed by independent research to be of some authoritative value are generally so variant in factual setting as to render
detailed discussion of them often more confusing than helpful."
Under such difficulties a weaker (or more prudent) court might seek
refuge in equivocation. The court here grasped the nettle :6.rmly and
perhaps more expressively than was intended:
"With this thought in mind, we merely cite a few illustrative
cases selected from many which are deemed supportive of the
principles upon which our decision rests. Some of these cases relate to one facet, others to another, of the problem which has been
resolved. Considering these authorities together, the net effect of
the decisions fill:d expressions in them makes us con:6.dent that our
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decision upon the issue presently before us constitutes no departure
from the norm...."5

If this conclusion is to be read literally, "law" here consists of a congerie of isolated cases, a review of which will create a non-rational
opinion-a subjective "hunch"-in the reviewing body. This opinion
is measured against a decision previously made, and if the opinion
formed does not demonstrate that the decision was erroneously reached,
it will be issued as the decision of the court.
Another decision imports a trial of wits concept into determining
taxability, observing that where an intention to minimize taxes is shown,
"the court should examine the forms used by [the taxpayer] for the
accomplishment of his purpose with particular care; and if his ingenuity
fails at any point, the court should not lend him its aid by resolving
doubts in his favor." 6
Why have courts so openly abjured a rational approach to tax avoidance problems? The reasons are many. Fact situations in the cases are
often extremely complex, especially in the area of reorganizations, where
tax saving through purely formal compliance with statutory requirements is frequently attempted. The ingenuity of taxpayers is such that
cases seldom establish factual patterns so that general principles of
liability can be said to be involved. Moreover, a shift of judicial emphasis may lead to differences in result even where substantially similar
facts are involved. The distinctions between what the court will permit as tax saving and what it will forbid are more than usually likely to
be made on conclusions that cannot readily be articulated, that is: "This
taxpayer just went too far." This also means, of course, that the decision is likely to be emotional to an exceptional extent. Generalization
is likewise impeded by the circumstance that the search of taxpayers for
loopholes extends throughout the entire tax structure, so that the subject matter could scarcely be more broad. Finally, the difficulties in
5 Sloane v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1951) 188 F. (2d) 254 at 260. See also Okonite
Co. v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1946) 155 F. (2d) 248 at 252: "Since no two cases of this
sort are ever identical, distinctions may be drawn that are more facile than they are fundamental. We are made all the more certain in our conclusion by the general congruence of
the cases mentioned with the result in this case. Okonite points to the me of different words
in the plans which were the subject of review in the other cases •••• We find no such
controlling significance in the different words used. The conclusion does not turn on form."
Compare Steubenville Bridge Co., 11 T.C. 789 at 798 (1948): "An attempt to reconcile
all the cases on this point with very complicated factual distinctions would be a voluminous
and unfeasible task. We shall limit ourselves to a review of the litigated situations sufficiently to illustrate the distinctions which the courts have generally drawn," and R. D.
Merril Co., 4 T.C. 955 at 969 (1945): "We do not deem it necessary to analyze in detail
the many factors which affect our decision."
6 Morsman v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1937) 90 F. (2d) 18.
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analyzing the decisions are not eased by the manner in which they are
written. Whether by design or accident, the decisions frequently do
not trace through the thread of the respective arguments of the parties.
All too often the appellate courts borrow the Tax Court technique: a
mass of facts is set forth in the early stages of the opinion, followed by
a short statement of the holding, referable in general to the facts but
without a reasoned argument. The opinion, normally filling the gap
between facts and result, is simply omitted. 7
Notwithstanding the difficulties in analysis, it should not be too
easily concluded that no measurable principles of law are here applicable. The cases may be assembled into the following categories:
Decision by Invective and Unmeaningful Words. The tendency
toward the use of epithets-whether as the sole or supplementary basis
for preventing tax avoidance in a particular case-has been well marked
in the United States Supreme Court. The leading case in this area is
Gregory 11. Helvering, in which it was said with respect to a claimed
corporate reorganization: "The whole undertaking ... was in fact an
elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate
reorganization, and nothing else. . . . To hold otherwise would be to
exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory provision in
question of all serious purpose."8
Some years later the Court observed: "A given result at the end of
a straight path is not made a different result because reached by following a devious path. The preliminary distribution to the stockholders
was a meaningless and unnecessary incident in the transmission of the
fund to the creditors, all along intended to come into their hands, so
transparently artificial that further discussion would be a needless waste
of ti.me. "9
In the following year one transaction was described as follows: "...
a lawyer's ingenuity devised a technically elegant arrangement whereby
an intricate outward appearance was given to the simple sale. . . ."10
7 See, for example, Sloane v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1951) 188 F. (2d) 254; Lewis
v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 646; Okonite Co. v. Commissioner, (3d Cir.
1946) 155 F. (2d) 248.
8 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 at 470, 55 S.Ct. 266 (1935). Compare Adam
A. Adams, 4 T.C. 1186 (1945). Also see Forman v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1952) 199
F. (2d) 881, referring to the duty of the courts to "pierce the false."
9 Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609 at 613, 58 S.Ct. 393 (1938). See also
_Conrad N. Hilton and Sari G. Hilton, 13 T.C. 623 (1949); Granburg Equipment Co.,
Inc., 11 T.C. 704 (1948); Walter S. Heller, 2 T.C. 371 (1943).
10 Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355 at 357, 60 S.Ct. 277 (1939). See also
Maletis v. United States, (9th Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 97; Seabrook v. Commissioner, (5th
Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 322; Alexander v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 921.
Compare Davis B. Thornton, 5 T.C. 116 at 126 (1945) (dissent) and 1432 Broadway
Corp., 4 T.C. 1158 (1945).
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Other comments by the court have been equally pointed and unilluminating. It has been emphasized that a transaction will be disregarded if it is a sham or unreal.11 Under the same terminology it has
been said the proper test in the family partnership cases is whether the
. was "real" un der the revenue 1aws,12 and "rea1·1ty" m
· genpartnersh1p
13
eral has not infrequently been thought determinative. Also familiar
is the comment that "A 'reorganization' which is merely a vehicle, however elaborate or elegant, for conveying earnings from accumulations
to the stockholders is not a reorganization under §112"14 and the observation that "To permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised
by mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax liabilities, would
seriously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of
Congress."15
11 National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 69 S.Ct. 726 (1949);
Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 63 S.Ct. 1132 (1943); Helvering
v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378, 56 S.Ct. 269 (1935); Burnet v. Commonwealth
Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415 at 419, 53 S.Ct. 198 (1932); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S.
473, 60 S.Ct. 355 (1940). The observation has been reiterated by the lower courts. Alexander v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 921; Twin Oaks Co. v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 385; Paymer v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1945) 150 F.
(2d) 334; Commissioner v. Laughton, (9th Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 103; Bruce v. Helvering, (D.C. Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 442. See also Central Cuba Sugar Co., 16 T.C.
882 (1951); Shaffer Terminals, Inc., 16 T.C. 356 (1951); Estate of L. B. Whitfield, 14
T.C. 776 (1950); Toledo Blade Co., 11 T.C. 1079 (1948); Transport, Trading & Terminal Corp., 9 T.C. 247 (1947); T. W. Rosborough, 8 T.C. 136 (1947); S. Kenneth
Alexander, 6 T.C. 804 (1946); Carlton B. Overton, 6 T.C. 304 (1946); W. M. Mauldin,
5 T.C. 743 at 749 (1945); Davis B. Thornton, 5 T.C. 116 (1945); 1432 Broadway
Corp., 4 T.C. 1158 (1945); Stanley D. Beard, 4 T.C. 756 (1945); Crown Cork International Corp., 4 T.C. 19 (1944); P.O'B. Montgomery, I T.C. 1000 (1943).
12 Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949). See also, in non-partnership
cases, Stiver v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1937) 90 F. (2d) 505; St. Louis Union Trust Co.
v. United States, (8th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 61. Tax Court decisions are similar. W. M.
Mauldin, 5 T.C. 743 (1945); William F. Fischer, 5 T.C. 507 (1945).
13 Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941) ("camouflage of reality"); Helvering
v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 60 S.Ct. 209 (1939) ("substance and realities"); Nordling
v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 703 ("realities, not artificialities"); Commissioner v. Greenspun, (5th Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 917 ("transactions to be effective •••
must have reality"). See also Royal Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1943) 139 F. (2d)
958; Helvering v. Tyler, (8th Cir. 1940) Ill F. (2d) 422. For similar Tax Court decisions,
see Granburg Equipment, Inc., 11 T.C. 704 (1948); Acampo Winery & Distilleries, Inc.,
7 T.C. 629 (1946); Koppers Coal Co., 6 T.C. 1209 (1946); Carlton B. Overton, 6 T.C.
304 (1946); W. N. Fry, 5 T.C. 1058 (1945); Frederick R. Home, 5 T.C. 250 (1945);
Seminole Flavor Co., 4 T.C. 1215 (1945).
14 Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 at 743, 67 S.Ct. 1489 (1947). Of a similar
general nature is the description of a tax saving device as an "attempt to simulate by book
entries the basis for a tax credit." Royal Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1943) 139 F.
(2d) 958. The Bazley case likewise refers to a "paper recapitalization," with which may
be compared the reference in Mauldin v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1946) 155 F. (2d) 666
to "mere paper reallocation of income." See also Foster v. United States, 303 U.S. 118 at
121, 58 S.Ct. 424 (1938): "The use of bookkeeping terms and accounting forms and
devices cannot be permitted to devitalize valid tax laws." And see Barrett v. Commissioner,
(1st Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 150, referring to "outer form."
1 5 Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 at 334, 65 S.Ct. 707 (1945).
Compare Court Holding Co., 2 T.C. 531 at 538 (1943).
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To the extent that comments such as the foregoing are merely the
expression of a result they are obviously unobjectionable. However,
so far as they may be and have been considered to embody a rational
process by which the court reached its decision, they may well be misleading. This much is clear: a person seeking to project a rule for
future conduct of the courts will £nd few bases for prediction in past
invectives. 16
Other comments of the courts-in terms which imply a shade less
moral obloquy or personal condemnation-are no more enlightening.
For example, analysis is hardly promoted by the observation, however
true, that taxation is a practical matter. 17
Neither are we aided by the observation that substance must be
regarded rather than form. 18 The Supreme Court has recently dubbed
16 Note the comments of the court in Kocin v. United States, (2d Cir. 1951) 187 F.
(2d) 707 at 708: "In keeping with the decisions, it could be called a 'sham,' a 'disguise,' a
'masquerade,' a 'fiction,' a 'subterfuge,' a 'make-believe,' a 'mere pretense,' a 'mask,' a
'screen,' a 'veil,' an 'artifice,' a 'ruse,' or other names, supplied by the dictionary, which
indicate that it does not succeed as an insulator of the corporation from tax liability.''
11 Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 61 S.Ct. 759 (1941); Kohn v. Commissioner,
(2d Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 480; Barrett v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d)
150; Tennessee, Alabama & Georgia Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d)
826; Page v. Haverty, (5th Cir. 1942) 129 F. (2d) 512; Snowden v. McCabe, (6th Cir.
1940) 111 F. (2d) 743; Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., (6th Cir. 1938) 99
F. (2d) 588; Paul G. Greene, 7 T.C. 142 (1946); Koppers Coal Co., 6 T.C. 1209 (1946).
1 s Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 44 S.Ct. 490 (1924); United States v. Phellis, 257
U.S. 156, 42 S.Ct. 63 (1921); Batch's Estate v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1952) 198 F.
(2d) 26; Royal Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1943) 139 F. (2d) 958; Berwind v.
Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 451; Mead v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1942)
131 F. (2d) 323; Earp v. Jones, (10th Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 292; Commissioner v.
Falcon Co., (5th Cir. 1942) 127 F. (2d) 277; Morgan Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, (4th
Cir. 1941) 124 F. (2d) 602; Louis W. Gunby, Inc. v. Helvering, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 122 F.
(2d) 203; Inland Development Co. v. Commissioner, (10th Cir. 1941) 120 F. (2d)
986; Tinkoff v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1941) 120 F. (2d) 564; Buhl v. Kavanagh,
(6th Cir. 1941) 118 F. (2d) 315; Helvering v. Tyler, (8th Cir. 1940) 111 F. (2d)
422; Snowden v. McCabe, (6th Cir. 1940) 111 F. (2d) 743; Commissioner v. Southern
Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., (6th Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 397; Commissioner v.
Ashland Oil & Refining Co., (6th Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 588; Mersman v. Commissioner,
(8th Cir. 1937) 90 F. (2d) 18; North Jersey Title Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, (3d
Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 898; Starr v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 964;
Halliburton v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 265; Helvering v. Security Savings & Commercial Bank, (4th Cir. 1934) 72 F. (2d) 874; Tnlsa Tribune Co. v. Commissioner, (10th Cir. 1932) 58 F. (2d) 937; Labrot v. Burnet, (D.C. Cir. 1932) 57 F. (2d)
413; Clemmons v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 209; Board v. Commissioner,
(6th Cir. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 73. In recent years an occasional echo from the past is heard.
Tennessee, Alabama & Georgia Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 826.
See also Twin Oaks Co. v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 385 at 387,
referring to changes "in form only, without substance'' and Overton v. Commissioner, (2d
Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 155 at 156, concerning "exalting form above substance.'' Compare
Slayton v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 497 at 500: "The actual facts and
not form is the determining factor... .''
Other decisions have emphasized that "the incidence of taxation depends on the substance of a transaction" [Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 at 334, 65 S.Ct.
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this distinction "unrealistic,"19 and Judge Learned Hand described it
at an earlier date as an "anodyne for the pains of reasoning."20 The
courts have emphasized "actualities"21 or "good faith," 22 and occasionally have described the tax result of a transaction by saying that it was
or was not ''bona 6.de."23 Equally general is the designation of "con707 (1945)] and still others, variously phrased, likewise emphasize "substance." Helvering
v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 62 S.Ct. 540 (1942); Higgins v. Smith,
308 U.S. 473, 60 S.Ct. 355 (1940); Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 60 S.Ct.
209 (1939); Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415, 53 S.Ct. 198
(1932). The Tax Court cases convey similar emphasis. Conrad N. Hilton, 13 T.C. 623
(1949); Tennessee, Alabama and Georgia Ry. Co., 13 T.C. 486 (1949); Granberg Equipment, Inc., 11 T.C. 704 (1948); Standard Realization Co., IO T.C. 708 (1948); Acampo
Winery & Distilleries, Inc., 7 T.C. 629 (1946); Isabella M. Sheldon, 6 T.C. 510 (1946);
Jacob DeKorse, 5 T.C. 94 (1945); 1432 Broadway Corporation, 4 T.C. 1158 (1945). See
also Nordberg Mfg. Co. v. Kuhl, (D.C. Wis. 1946) 69 F. Supp. 750 and DuPont v.
Deputy, (D.C. Del. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 33.
19 Helvering

v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 61 S.Ct. 646 (1941).
v. Sansome, (2d Cir. 1932) 60 F. (2d) 931 at 933.
v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 69 S.Ct. 1210 (1949); Maletis v.
United States, (9th Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 97; Mauldin v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1946)
155 F. (2d) 666; Buhl v. Kavanagh, (6th Cir. 1941) 118 F. (2d) 315. Compare
Morgan Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1941) 124 F. (2d) 602 at 605 ("actually
intended"); Slayton v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 497 ("actual facts");
S. Silberman & Sons v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 360 ("actually paid");
and Niles v. Milbourne, (4th Cir. 1939) 100 F. (2d) 723 ("actual sale and purchase").
See also May Dept. Stores Co., 16 T.C. 547 (1951); Shaffer Terminals, Inc., 16 T.C. 356
(1951); Cooper Foundation, 7 T.C. 389 (1946); 1432 Broadway Corp., 4 T.C. 1158
(1945).
22 Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 69 S.Ct. 1210 (1949); Brown v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 926; Thompson v. Riggs, (8th Cir. 1949) 175 F.
(2d) 81; Commissioner v. Montgomery, (5th Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 313. The treachery
of such terms as "good faith" is illustrated by the Brown case. There a taxpayer transferred
property to his children in trust, with an understanding that the trustee would lease the
property back to the taxpayer. This had the obvious purpose and effect of redirecting to
the children a portion of what would normally be the earnings of the taxpayer. Notwithstanding that the trustee had the legal power to enforce payment of rents by the taxpayer,
it might appear to some that the term "good faith" was something less than accurate in
describing the transaction, but the court found it present and sustained the device. This
obviously does not demonstrate that the position of the court was wrong; but it indicates
that we are very far from objective measurement of tax consequences by such terms as "good
faith." For Tax Court decisions, see May Dept. Stores Co., 16 T.C. 547 (1951); Camie!
Thorrez, 5 T.C. 60 (1945) (dissent); Crown Cork International Corp., 4 T.C. 19 (1944).
Other decisions of courts of appeals include: Marcus v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1953)
201 F. (2d) 850; Toor v. Westover, (9th Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 713; Roughan v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 253; Kasper v. Baron, (8th Cir. 1951) 191 F.
(2d) 737.
23 E.g., Goodman v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1953) 200 F. (2d) 681; Seabrook v.
Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 322; Alexander v. Commissioner, (5th Cir.
1952) 194 F. (2d) 921; Bratton v. Commissioner, (10th Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 416;
Kasper v. Baron, (8th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 737; Barrett v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1950)
185 F. (2d) 150; Nelson v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 649; Gouldman
v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1948) 165 F. (2d) 686; Thorrez v. Commissioner, (6th Cir.
1946) 155 F. (2d) 791; Niles v. Milbourne, (4th Cir. 1939) 100 F. (2d) 723; McInemey v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 665. If the transaction is described
as ''bona fide" the tax is saved; if described as not ''bona fide" it is unavailing to save
20 Commissioner
21 Commissioner
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duit" 24 which courts frequently use to describe instrumentalities which
they ignore in order to frustrate tax avoidance.
Decision on "Policy" Bases. A somewhat different and even less
desirable ground of distinction between successful and unsuccessful
tax saving devices is contained in a frequently quoted opinion written
by Justice Holmes: "We do not speak of evasion, because, when the
law draws a line, a case is on one side of it or the other, and if on the
safe side is none the worse legally that a party has availed himself to the
full of what the law permits. When an act is condemned as an evasion
what is meant is that it is on the wrong side of the line indicated by the
policy if not by the mere letter of the law."25
This comment, when analyzed, has disturbing overtones. At a casual glance it appears that a taxpayer who complies with all the requirements of a statute may successfully avoid the imposition of a tax, however artificial the transaction might have been. A closer look, however,
indicates that his pains may have been taken in vain if he has stepped
outside the "policy" of the statute, which may be different from the
"mere letter" of the law. Presumably it follows that the courts will
decide first what the "policy" is, and secondly whether there is a conflict with the "mere letter" of the law inherent in the transaction. But
"policy" in a tax statute is not easy to find; presumably those within
the scope of the statute must pay a tax and others are excused. Moreover, since no bases are suggested for determining what the policy is,
and when a conflict exists, the observation seems unlikely to advance
analysis. It reveals a point of view held with respect to tax avoidance
the tax. Presumably "bona fide" and "good faith" are interchangeable terms. The
Latin appears more popular in the Tax Court. See Differential Steel Car Co., 16 T.C.
413 (1951); Standard Envelope Mfg. Co., 15 T.C. 41 (1950); Conrad N. Hilton, 13 T.C.
623 (1949); Granberg Equipment, Inc., 11 T.C. 704 (1948); Joseph W. Imler, 11 T.C.
836 (1948); T. W. Rosborough, 8 T.C. 136 (1947); Louis Adler Realty Co., 6 T.C. 778
(1946); Carlton B. Overton, 6 T.C. 304 (1946); W. M. Mauldin, 5 T.C. 743 (1945);
Stanley D. Beard, 4 T.C. 756 (1945); W. P. Hobby, 2 T.C. 980 (1943); Clara M. Tully
Trust, 1 T.C. 611 (1943). See also Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1953)
201 F. (2d) 874, quoted in note 1 supra.
24 United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U.S. 451, 70 S.Ct. 280
(1950); Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 65 S.Ct. 707 (1945); Griffiths
v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355, 60 S.Ct. 277 (1939); Kaufmann v. Commissioner, (3d
Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 28; Ingle Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1949) 174 F.
(2d) 569; Budd International Corp. v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1944) 143 F. (2d) 784;
Lyon, Inc. v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1942) 127 F. (2d) 210; Packard v. Commissioner,
(2d Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 488; United Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner, (7th Cir.
1939) 105 F. (2d) 866; Jones v. Page, (5th Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 144; Electrical Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 593; Bank of America Nat. Trust &
Savings Assn., 15 T.C. 544 (1950); Conrad N. Hilton, 13 T.C. 623 (1949); Dallas Downtown Development Co., 12 T.C. 114 (1949).
25 Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 at 630-631, 36 S.Ct. 473 (1916).
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some thirty-five years ago, but decisions under this doctrine seem peculiarly to represent what Justice Roberts has described as "a ticket good
for this day and train only."
Decision by Common Sense. Still another general approach has
been (perhaps facetiously) suggested: the view that the solution to the
problem here will be found in the exercise of common sense.26 However much this consummation is to be desired, revenue agents and taxpayers notoriously disagree on what tax consequences should arise from
a transaction, each claiming the support of that general assortment of
information, logic, experience and intuition described as common sense.
There is, alas, no guarantee that the bench has a monopoly on the
commodity; some have even doubted that the bench has an aliquot proportion. This in turn raises the philosophical question: Can you determine whether a judicial decision is right? 27 Until such time as it is
demonstrated that the judges adopt the "right" side as between contending litigants we must continue the search for a more explicit
rationale to resolve the question of tax avoidance. The "common sense"
concept consequently hardly commends itself as a source of accurate
prediction respecting the success of tax avoidance devices in any case
doubtful enough to give rise to litigation.
The Result is Controlled by What Was Done. Other approaches
to the problem have a more convincing but equally deceptive appearance of rationality. Included among these is the comment which was
made at an early date by the United States Supreme Court that "questions of taxation must be determined by viewing what was actually
done, rather than the declared purpose of the participants"28 or by
2 6 Batman v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 107 at 110-111: "If courts
and judges were a little wiser, or not quite so wise; if we could see, as we should see, face
to face, or, though not as through a glass darkly, not quite so clearly as we sometimes
erroneously think we see; if we fully understood sernasiology and the uses and abuses of
words; we should be as little troubled, should have as little difficulty, in piercing through
the name 'partnership' to the facts in family partnership cases as the court had in Guy v.
Donald, supra. If knowing, or using, a little less of technical legal reasoning, we knew and
used a little more of common sense; if, as the child, in the story of the Emperor's Garment,
saw through the pretense to the fact, that the Emperor in reality had no garment on; if, in
short, we could see this case, as it really is, we could easily see that what is presented as
a partnership here is really not one at all. It is merely an arrangement for shoring up and
expanding the family fortunes at the expense of the tax collector."
27 The difficulties in such a decision are discussed with penetration in Magrish, "Can
We Prove That a Judicial Decision is 'Right'," 20 UNIV. Cm. L. R:Bv. 165 (1951).
28Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242, 44 S.Ct. 490 (1924). See also, Minnesota Tea Co.
v. Helvering, 320 U.S. 609, 58 S.Ct. 393 (1938); United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156,
42 S.Ct. 63 (1921). Numerous lower courts have reached the same result. See Louis W.
Gunby, Inc. v. Helvering, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 203; Snowden v. McCabe, (6th
Cir. 1940) 111 F. (2d) 743; Commissioner v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
(6th Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 397; Bruce v. Helvering, (D.C. Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 442;
Estate of John B. Lewis, 10 T.C. 1080 (1948).
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what "was done rather than by the mere form of words."29 Yet in none
of the decisions was there actual question as to what was done; the
conduct of the parties, such as signing of documents and other circumstances of the critical transactions, was never in issue. The words
might be thought to mean that a taxpayer will not be heard to protest
that he is doing one thing, if he is actually doing another, but such a
proposition hardly requires affirmation by the United States Supreme
Court. Perhaps something further is implied. If so, the conclusion
would seem to be that if a taxpayer says he is doing one thing, and goes
through all of the formal motions which would give him a legitimate
basis under the statute for such a claim, he will in some cases nevertheless not be heard to make his claim. The immediate inquiry, of
course, is "In what cases, and why?" That question is not answered,
and it is evident that analysis is not advanced by the assertion that the
court is examining what was done when-at least literally-there is
no dispute on that issue. It seems probable that in fact the comments
here are neither more nor less meaningful than the general expression
that substance will be regarded over form.
We have thus far been examining what may be considered a semantic smoke screen in discussions about the problem. A good many
decisions-written in haste or despair-do not provide further analysis.
Others do, and have content of sufficient respectability to merit discussion. Whatever may be of value in the search for firm guides to
prediction of results in tax avoidance cases is found in this latter group.
For purposes of preliminary examination these cases have been separated into two classes: those which support judicial frustration of tax
avoidance and those which do not.
Judicial Self-limitation in Tax Avoidance Cases

Several principles have been advanced which support the general
view that courts should readily recognize tax_ consequences required by
compliance with formal terms of the statute. One of these is the well
known observation in the Gregory case that "The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or
altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be
doubted." 30 This sentiment was not then new, 31 and has since been
20 Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481, 57 S.Ct. 569 (1937). Compare 0.
William Lowry, 3 T.C. 730 (1944).
30-Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 at 469, 55 S.Ct. 266 (1935).
31 See Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 36 S.Ct. 473 (1916).
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frequently restated.32 To a greater extent than other generalities this
comment expresses a conviction that the existence of a tax advantage
does not automatically and in all events taint a transaction to the point
where it will be disregarded for tax purposes. At the same time, the
weasel words so indigenous to the subject are not wanting. Here they
are found in the expression ''by means which the law permits." Since
the enterprise at hand is finding what the law does not permit, and
the cases are silent on that subject, we do not progress far under this
doctrine. It is ironic but not unexpected that the decisions generally
conclude that the means were not permitted by law. 33
A second viewpoint is encompassed in a series of decisions holding
that the issue "always is whether the transaction under scrutiny is in
fact what it appears to be in form." The doctrine was first suggested
in the Chisholm case of the Second Circuit in 193534 and has won
32 E.g., in Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946); Batman v. Commissioner,
(5th Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 107; Earp v. Jones, (10th Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 292; Starr
v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 964; Estate of John B. Lewis, 10 T.C. 1080
(1948); Acampo Winery & Distilleries, Inc., 7 T.C. 629 (1946), and Camie! Thorrez, 5
T.C. 60 (1945) (dissent). It is sometimes said [Seminole Flavor Co., 4 T.C. 1215 at 1235
(1945)] that: "there was no obligation on the stockholders to arrange their own ••• affairs
so as to result in a maximum tax burden." See also Stanley D. Beard, 4 T.C. 756 (1945);
Kaufmann Department Stores Securities Corp., 2 T.C. 656 (1943); Koppers Co., 2 T.C.
152 (1943). For additional comment, note Clara M. Tully Trust, 1 T.C. 611 at 621
(1943): "The respondent's argument in this proceeding seems largely based upon the fact
that petitioners could have turned in their 10,000 shares of second preference stock to the
Coming Glass Works for cash and thus have been taxed 100 percent on the gains, rather
than to have sold the stock to an outside party and be taxed on the percentages of capital
gains as provided by law, and that, because they did not do it that way, they should nevertheless be taxed as if they had done it that way." Sometimes this doctrine is stated in language more eloquent than helpful. See, for example, Deal v. Morrow, (5th Cir. 1952) 197
F. (2d) 821 at 826, where it was said: "It is one thing to say that when a taxpayer has a
choice of methods for accomplishing a business result, all of them real, genuine and bona
fide, and one of them will minimize his taxes more than another, he can employ that one.
It is quite another thing to say that a purely synthetic expedient, having no real function
as to the taxpayer and the sale, and serving no genuine purpose as to him except to reduce
his taxes, may not be condemned as ineffective for that purpose." See also Riddlesbarger v.
Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 165, and Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner,
(3d Cir. 1953) 201 F. (2d) 874, quoted in note 1 supra.
33 See cases cited supra at note 32. Compare, however, Commissioner v. Eldridge,
(9th Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 629.
34 Chisholm v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 14 at 15. The court said,
"The question always is whether the transaction under scrutiny is in fact what it appears
to be in form; a marriage may be a joke; a contract may be intended only to deceive others;
an agreement may have a collateral defeasance. In such cases the transaction as a whole is
different from its appearance. True, it is always the intent that controls; and we need not
for this occasion press the difference between intent and purpose. We may assume that
purpose may be the touchstone, but the purpose which counts is one which defeats or
contradicts the apparent transaction, not the purpose to escape taxation which the apparent,
but not the whole, transaction would realize. In Gregory v. Helvering, ••. the incorporators
adopted the usual form for creating business corporations; but their intent, or purpose, was
merely to draught the papers, in fact not to create corporations as the court understood that
word. That was the purpose which defeated their exemption, not the accompanying pur-
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support in the Sixth,35 Third,36 and Eighth37 Circuits. At first the
phrase conveys that orotund ring associated with political speeches
and evangelistic campaigns. Actually it involves much more than that.
In analyzing this doctrine it must first be noted that, at least in theory,
an intention to avoid taxes does not in itself require the courts to reject
a tax saving device. 38 Under the Chisholm doctrine, it is stated that
an intention which "defeats or contradicts the apparent transaction"
may be determinative of tax liability.
This kind of a distinction seems dubious. If intention to save a
tax is immaterial, should not an intention to change the appearance of
a transaction be likewise immaterial? The explanation may be that as
a matter of policy the courts are not prepared to say that every transaction motivated by a tax saving purpose should be disregarded for all
tax purposes. Neither does the court want to open the door to tax
avoidance by saying that intention of every sort is immaterial. The
compromise is to say that some intention-though not intention to save
taxes-is material. What is this intention? To get back to the
epithets, it may be stated that the taxpayer intended a thing which
·hout "substance" or was not
was a "h
s am" or "unreal" or wit
''b ona £ide. ,,
pose to escape taxation; that purpose was legally neutral. Had they really meant to conduct
a business by means of the two reorganized companies, they would have escaped whatever
other aim they might have had, whether to avoid taxes, or to regenerate the world." For a
similar line of reasoning, see Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 at 288-289, 66 S.Ct.
533 (1946): "Respondent contends that the Tax Court's holding that he is taxable for the
profits from the partnership is contrary to a principle long recognized by this Court that 'The
legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or
altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted.' Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469. We do not reject that principle. It would clearly apply, for
example, in a situation where a member of a partnership, in order to keep from paying
future taxes on partnership profits and in order to get into a lower income tax bracket, sells
his interest to a stranger, relinquishing all control of the business. But the situation is
different where the taxpayer draws a paper purporting to sell his partnership interest even
to a stranger, though actually he continues to control the business to the extent he had
before the 'sale' and channels the income to his wife. Then a showing that the arrangement
was made for the express purpose of reducing taxes simply lends further support to the
inference that the husband still controls the income from his partnership interest, that no
partnership really exists and that the earnings are really his and are therefore taxable to
him and not to his wife. The arrangement we are here considering was of the type where
proof of a motive to reduce income taxes simply lent further strength to the inference drawn
by the Tax Court that the wife was not really a partner.'' See also note 30 supra, and text.
United States v. Cummins Distilleries Corp., (6th Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 17.
Meurer Steel Barrel Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 282;
Commissioner v. Gilmore's Estate, (3d Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 791.
37 Morsman v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1937) 90 F. (2d) 18. The view has likewise
been taken in the Tax Court. See W. P. Hobby, 2 'J'..C. 980 (1943); Court Holding Co.,
2 T.C. 531 (1943).
38 For a discussion of the theory that a motive to save taxes is immaterial in this context, see notes 41 to 56 infra, and text.
35
36
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The difficulties with words such as these has been noted. It is
not helpful to explain this doctrine--as did the court-by remarking
that a marriage may be a joke, or a contract may have reservations, and
that therefore courts may deny the validity of both if "the transaction
as a whole is different from its appearance." A line between taxability
and non-taxability can hardly be drawn by a general observation that
things are not always what they seem, or what they are intended to
seem. Stated baldly, this doctrine seems to be that when a taxpayer
intends one thing but pretends to intend another, effect will be given
to the intention that he really had, and not the one he pretended to have.
At least two things are wrong about such a doctrine: it seems somewhat less than frank, since it is claimed that a tax saving intention is
immaterial. But as a practical matter, surely no one would believe
that such a conclusion would be reached in any case unless an intention
to avoid taxes were present. The whole purpose of having any doctrine
at all is to prevent tax avoidance. Second, the rule that a tax saving
motive does not affect the tax consequences of a transaction seems to
arise because a decision as to intention is too subjective; that under such
a doctrine tax avoidance would be frustrated or approved in the unlimited discretion of the court. This deficiency is not cured in the
rule suggested; no limit to judicial discretion appears in a doctrine
under which the tax consequences of a transaction are dependent on
whether a taxpayer intended one thing but pretended to intend another.
This deficiency is illustrated in the reference of the court in the
Second Circuit to the Gregory case, which had just then been decided
by the Supreme Court. It was said that there the incorporators
adopted the usual form for creating business corporations, but their
intention was merely to draft the papers. Literally, this just was not
so. In legal effect the incorporators constituted new corporations,
and this effect was intended. This intention was, of course, subsidiary
to the further intention of saving taxes by the transaction. It is logicchopping with a vengeance to say that the factor which impelled the
Supreme Court to deny recognition to the corporate device was unrelated to the fact that the transaction was designed to save taxes, and
turned on the fact that the parties to the transaction pretended to intend
something which they did not in fact intend. Further, that the logic
is tenuous is demonstrated by the interpretation put on the Chisholm
case by the court in the Third Circuit, which cited the case in concluding that a partnership there involved was "... merely an ingenious
method adopted for the sale of the corporate assets. The shrewd preconceived plan does not effectively disguise this primary intent." Such
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language would seem to indicate that the court there considered that
formation of the partnership should be nugatory for tax purposes
because done pursuant to an intention to save taxes, a view explicitly
rejected in the Chisholm case.
Actually, the Chisholm case may have a meaning expressed in the
conclusion that the purpose which is paramount is the purposeexpressed in the Gregory terms-to do business by means of the transaction. In Chisholm, the court suggested that the absence of intention
to really do business with the corporations created was fatal to the tax
saving device in the Gregory case. On the other hand, the partnership
in Chisholm was considered to have a purpose-management of property-and that purpose insulated the tax saving device from frustration. It seems probable-although not completely clear-that the case
turned on this circumstance. In any event, the time has now arrived
to consider further the effect of intention in tax avoidance cases.
The General Signi-ficance of Intention. Not infrequently the state
of mind of the taxpayer determines tax liability under specific requirements of the statute. Examples which most readily come to mind include the contemplation of death provision respecting federal estate
taxes [I.R.C., §Sll(c)] and the cases respecting unreasonable accumulation of surplus [I.R.C., §102]. Other more recent statutes include
section 129, which imposes tax where tax avoidance is a "principal purpose" of certain transfers, and section 45, which authorizes the Commissioner to reallocate gross income and deductions in certain cases where
it is necessary to prevent "evasion" of taxes or clearly to reflect income.
In addition, the question of motive has been consistently troublesome in all attempts to work out a rationale to control tax avoidance
outside of the specific statutory cases. We are not here concerned with
cases turning, for example, on such issues as whether a transaction was
a loan or contribution to capital,39 or whether a merger or sale was
contemplated. 40 What we are interested in here is the case where it is
acknowledged or asserted that tax saving was a motivating factor in
what was done.
It is frequently stated in those cases that a tax saving motive behind
a transaction is immaterial for tax purposes. This is unquestionably the
most confusing doctrine of all, for it is almost never asserted unless
39 The decision in Wilshire & Western Sandwiches v. Co=issioner, (9th Cir. 1949)
175 F. (2d) 718 for example, turned on such an issue.
40 As in e.g., Banner Machine Co. v. Routzahn, (6th Cir. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 147.
For a list of cases in which intention was thought to be critical, see Helvering v. National
Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282 at 289, 58 S.Ct. 932 (1938).
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accompanied by a caveat.41 Thus, decisions asserting this rule have
stated it to be applicable in reorganization cases only if reorganization
was in fact effected 42 or adopted. 43 In other cases the rule is to be
applied only if there is conformance to the terms44 or the purpose45 of
the statute, or if the transaction is not a sham and has substance,46 or is
in fact what it appears to be in form,47 or is genuine48 or has the
"essential elements" necessary to establish its validity as an actual sale
and purchase49 or is in reality what it appears to be50 or is not illegal or
fraudulent. 51 Moreover, the actual result in some cases demonstrates
that tax savings under a transaction have in fact been denied because
the transaction was obviously motivated by tax avoidance.52
Any "rule" so apologetically stated and qualified fore and aft is not
likely to convince. This is especially true in view of the cases sustaining
tax saving under certain transactions in which the courts have emphasized that no tax avoidance intention was demonstrated. Frequently the
cases have reiterated that a transaction was entered into in "good
41 For exceptions to the rule, see Commissioner v. H. W. Porter Co., (3d Cir. 1951)
187 F. (2d) 939; Mead Corp. v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 187.
42 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S.Ct. 266 (1935).
48 Survaunt v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 753.
44 Electrical Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 593.
45 Fairfield S. S. Corp. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1946) 157 F. (2d) 321; Commissioner v. Riggs, (3d Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 1004; Estate of Hill, 10 T.C. 1090 (1948);
Estate of John B. Lewis, 10 T.C. 1080 (1948).
46 Twin Oaks Co. v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 385. See also
Standard Envelope Mfg. Co., 15 T.C. 41 (1950).
47 See notes 34 to 36 supra, and text.
48 United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U.S. 451, 70 S.Ct. 280
(1950); Gouldman v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1948) 165 F. (2d) 686. Compare May
Dept. Stores Co., 16 T.C. 547 (1951); Jacob DeKorse, 5 T.C. 94 (1945).
49 Niles v. Milbourne, (4th Cir. 1939) 100 F. (2d) 723.
50 Morsman v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1937) 90 F. (2d) 18. See also T. W. Rosborough, 8 T.C. 136 (1947); W. M. Mauldin, 5 T.C. 743 (1945); Fairfield Steamship
Corp., 5 T.C. 566 (1945).
51 Eaton v. White, (1st Cir. 1934) 70 F. (2d) 449. Compare Howell Turpentine
Co., 6 T.C. 364 (1946).
52 See Hay v. Commissioner, ( 4th Cir. 1944) 145 F. (2d) 1001; Helvering v. Elkhorn
Coal Co., (4th Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 732; Starr v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1936) 82 F.
(2d) 964. Compare Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 61 S.Ct. 759 (1941), in which
a tax saving device was frustrated on the ground that tax avoidance was the "obvious purpose
and effect" of the transaction. See also Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 58
S.Ct. 393 (1938). For similar results in the Tax Court, see Central Cuba Sugar Co., 16
T.C. 882 (1951); Rufus Riddlesbarger, 16 T.C. 820 (1951); Granberg Equipment, Inc.,
11 T.C. 704 (1948); Alprosa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240 (1948); Carlton B. Overton, 6
T.C. 304 (1946); Jacob DeKorse, 5 T.C. 94 (1945); Crown Cork International Corp., 4
T.C. 19 (1944); William C. Hay, 2 T.C. 460 (1943). See also May v. McGowan, (2d
Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 396: " •.. the district court found there was no purpose to evade
taxes."
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faith."53 While the term lacks specific content it is at least possible that
it means that no tax saving purpose was present. 54 In other cases, the
decision has been specifically justified on the basis that no tax avoidance
plan was established.55 It has likewise been asserted that tax incidence
depends rather on economic reality than purity of motive.56 In all of
these cases courts have found it necessary to justify de.cisions for taxpayers by reciting that in the case decided the taxpayer had no tax
saving purpose. One is impelled to inquire what relevance this has if
the intention of the taxpayer is really immaterial.
The doctrine that a tax saving intention is not material is accordingly hedged about with limitations and qualifications of the most
general nature. Indeed, the pious protestation that an intention to avoid
taxes has no effect on tax liability simply cannot be the law under any
circumstances. The existence of a calculated plan to avoid taxes is the
basic explanation for all of the cases concerning the effect of transactions which are commercially unfamiliar and comply with formal requirements for minimizing taxes under the statutes.
The 'Was the Transaction Binding" Test. Another doctrine recently
restated is that as long as any tax saving transaction entered into by the
taxpayer is actually binding on him, it is valid and effective to minimize
tax liability. There is a deceptive simplicity about the rule. In a recent
53 Bro~ v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 926; Commissioner v. Phila•
delphia Transportation Co., (3d Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 255. See also cases cited in notes
22 and 23 supra.
54 This seems especially true in the family partnership cases. See Commissioner v.
Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 69 S.Ct. 1210 (1949); Thompson v. Riggs, (8th Cir. 1949)
175 F. (2d) 81. Note also Valspar Corp. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d)
171, in which reference is made to "bad faith or tax evasion."
55 Commissioner v. Edmonds' Estate, (3d Cir. 1948) 165 F. (2d) 715; United National Corp. v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1944) 143 F. (2d) 580; Commissioner v. Webster's
Estate, (5th Cir. 1942).131 F. (2d) 426 at 429: ''The transaction here involved was not a
pure subterfuge designed at tax avoidance like that condemned in Gregory v. Helvering.•••
Here the method undertaken was a plain statutory procedure available to the corporations
by reason of their legitimate business status, not by virtue of any situation in which they
had deliberately placed themselves, and the record clearly shows that several business considerations prompted the selection of the merger as the means by which to accomplish their
intended result. That tax avoidance was one of the considerations is of no importance." See
also Morgan Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1941) 124 F. (2d) 602. and Louis
W. Gunby, Inc. v. Commissioner, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 203 at 206: "If Gunby's
purpose in giving the particular form he did to this transaction had been to avoid income
taxes,-in other words, if his purpose had been to defraud the revenue, or if he had claimed
in his own behalf a loss on the securities turned over to the corporation,-we might be
justified in viewing the situation in a different light, but nothing of that kind is suggested,
and we think, in the circumstances, the fact that he did not comply with the Maryland law
should not control the decision we have to make. That law is an act regulating corporations.
It is not a revenue act." Inland Development Co. v. Commissioner, (10th Cir. 1941) 120
F. (2d) 986; Bruce v. Helvering, (D.C. Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 442; Cedar Valley Distillery,
16 T.C. 870 (1951); S. Kenneth Alexander, 6 T.C. 804 (1946); Seminole Flavor Co., 4
T.C. 1215 (1945); P.O'B. Montgomery, 1 T.C. 1000 (1943).
56 Hash v. Commissioner, ( 4th Cir. 1945) 152 F. (2d) 722.
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case involving a so-called step transaction, a tax saving device was
sustained on the ground that "the separate steps were all binding when
taken." 57 In an earlier case, a man gave funds to his wife, then gave a
note and borrowed them back, it appearing that he did so in order to
deduct the interest which he later paid on the note. The court held that
the taxpayer properly could claim a deduction:
"... Although Mr. Johnson may have had such confidence in
his wife's forbearance that he knew the note would not be collected during his life, nevertheless she was left legally free to . . .
collect it. The distinction, though often hard to detect in fact, is
perfectly clear in principle between creating rights which you trust
will not be exercised and creating no legal rights at all; a transaction of the first kind changes existing legal relations between the
parties, the other does not."58
In another early case, the issue was whether effect should be given
to a partnership obviously formed for tax reduction purposes. The
question was answered in the affirmative on the ground, among others,
that while the two brothers involved might collectively end the partnership when they wished, they were not bound to do so; and as long as
the partners were in fact bound, effect must be given to the partnership.50
This is another instance where a doctrine has a superficial ring of
truth and the virtue of absolute simplicity. Yet the cases in which the
courts have frustrated tax avoidance schemes are legion. In the majority of these-indeed, almost all-the transaction assigned as the basis
for reducing tax liability was in fact binding on the parties. The courts
nevertheless declined to give effect to the devices. 60 Under these circumstances it seems clear that this view cannot represent the law, notwithstanding occasional decisions supporting it below the Supreme
Court level. Actually, if this doctrine were generally approved, taxpayers would unquestionably find the challenge to their ingenuity too
inviting to resist.
57 Tennessee, Alabama & Georgia Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1951) 187 F.
(2d) 826 and see T. W. Rosborough, 8 T.C. 136 (1947); William F. Fischer, 5 T.C. 507
(1945). Compare, however, Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1940) 109 F. (2d)
479 and Toledo Blade Co., 11 T.C. 1079 (1948).
58 Johnson v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1936) 86 F. (2d) 710.
59 Chisholm v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 14. See also Jones v.
Helvering, (D.C. Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 214.
60 Note, for example, a few recent cases decided by the United States Supreme Court:
National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 69 S.Ct. 726 (1949); Commissioner v. Phipps, 336 U.S. 410, 69 S.Ct. 616 (1949); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.
591, 68 S.Ct. 715 (1948); Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 67 S.Ct. 1489 (1947);
Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 66 S.Ct. 532 (1946); Commissioner v. Court Hold-
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Judicial Principles Restricting Tax Avoidance
The View that the Revenue Must Come First. The foregoing
approaches, used in approval of tax saving doctrines, are confused and
self-contradictory. The converse doctrines, which are expressed by the
courts in expanding their powers to strike down tax avoidance schemes,
are scarcely more helpful. There is, for example, the somewhat astonishing statement-made in a moment of presumably unconscious candor-that a principle restricting tax avoidance by limiting carryover of
deficits in reorganizations was "... grounded ... on the necessity to
prevent escape of earnings and profits from taxation." 61
Other courts have been less blunt but likewise support their decisions by reliance on the conclusion that the revenue must come first.
The so-called epithet approach described earlier reflects this view. Other
decisions speak specifically of frustrating evasion of tax liability, 62 defeating the payment of taxes, 63 and conduct intended "solely to reduce
tax liability." 04
No court has said, however, and none is expected to say, that a
person who would incur tax liability if he handled a transaction in a
certain manner should always be said to have incurred that liability even
though he in fact concluded the transaction so as to avoid the tax. 65
ing Co., 324 U.S. 331, 65 S.Ct. 707 (1945). Compare, however, United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U.S. 451 at 453, 70 S.Ct. 280 (1950): "The Court of Claims
found that the method by which the stockholders disposed of the properties was avowedly
chosen in order to reduce taxes, but that the liquidation and ,dissolution genuinely ended
the corporation's activities and existence••.. Accordingly it found as a fact that the sale
was made· by the shareholders rather than the corporation, and entered judgment for
respondent."
61 Commissioner v. Phipps, 336 U.S. 410, 69 S.Ct. 616 (1949).
62Morgan Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1941) 124 F. (2d) 602.
63 Bruce v. Helvering, (D.C. Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 442.
64 Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 60 S.Ct. 355 (1940). Compare also Bazley v.
Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 at 742-743, 67 S.Ct. 1489 (1947): "One does not have to
pursue the motives behind actions, even in the more ascertainable forms of purpose, to find,
as did the Tax Court, that the whole arrangement took this form instead of an outright
distribution of cash or debentures, because the latter would undoubtedly have been taxable
income whereas what was done could, with a show of reason, claim the shelter of the
immunity of a recapitalization-reorganization." And see Steubenville Bridge Co., II T.C.
789 (1948), and cases cited.
65 Rather, the contrary is true. Commissioner v. Gilmore's Estate, (3d Cir. 1942) 130
F. (2d) 791 at 795-796: "Granted that the elimination of the holding company as a subject
for taxation was a legitimate business object, it does not follow that the method taken in
getting rid of it is a tax-free method. We think this gets down to the proposition that if
there are two ways of accomplishing a legitimate business result, one of which clearly creates
a taxable transaction, one is equally subject to tax liability if he chooses the other unless
there is an adequate business reason for the particular method used. We do not think this
is the rule of the statute, the Regulations, nor, as we read them, the decisions. The cases
cited by the appellant do not extend the Gregory doctrine this far. In each of them, that
which was attempted to be accomplished in a tax-free manner was not within the spirit and
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Hence, these comments do not really aid in drawing the line between
success and failure of tax avoidance devices.
The Business Purpose Rule. A leading principle in this area is
expressed in the view that a transaction which formally complies with
statutory requirements will be unavailing to reduce taxes unless undertaken with a business purpose. 66 In practice the doctrine has been

purpose of the reorganization provisions." Note also the comments in Commissioner v.
Kolb, (9th Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 920 at 926: ''Where for legitimate business purposes a
person has a choice of conducting his business transactions without tax liability, such a
liability does not arise simply because it would have arisen if another process had been
chosen." See also the cases cited at note 32 supra.
66 The principle is asserted in one form or another in many cases. See, for example,
National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 69 S.Ct. 726 (1949); Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283, 65 S.Ct. 1157 (1945); Moline Properties, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 63 S.Ct. 1132 (1943); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473,
60 S.Ct. 355 (1940); Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 58 S.Ct. 393 (1938);
Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378, 56 S.Ct. 269 (1935); Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465, 55 S.Ct. 266 (1935); 58th St. Plaza Theatre v. Commissioner, (2d Cir.
1952) 195 F. (2d) 724; Jones v. Baker, (10th Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 842; Kocin v.
United States, (2d Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 707; John L. Denning Co. v. Commissioner,
(10th Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 288; Lewis v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1949) 176 F.
(2d) 646; Commissioner v. Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., (2d Cir. 1949) 176
F. (2d) 570; Kohl v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 531; Gouldman v.
Commissoner, ( 4th Cir. 1948) 165 F. (2d) 686; Survaunt v. Commissioner, (8th Cir.
1947) 162 F. (2d) 753; Heady v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 699; Commissioner v. Greenspun, (5th Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 917; Thorrez v. Commissioner, (6th
Cir. 1946) 155 F. (2d) 791; Hash v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1945) 152 F. (2d) 722;
Stem v. Harrison, (7th Cir. 1945) 152 F. (2d) 321; Pa}'Jller v. Commissioner, (2d Cir.
1945) 150 F. (2d) 334; Tower v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 388; Palace
Theatre v. United States, (7th Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 30; Commissioner v. Smith, (2d
Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 556; Commissioner v. Webster's Estate, (5th Cir. 1942) 131 F.
(2d) 426; Commissioner v. Gilmore's Estate, (3d Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 791; Lyon, Inc.
v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1942) 127 F. (2d) 210; Morgan Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner,
(4th Cir. 1941) 124 F. (2d) 602; United States v. Brager Bldg. & Loan Corp., (4th Cir.
1941) 124 F. (2d) 349; Louis W. Gunby, Inc. v. Commissioner, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 122
F. (2d) 203; Tinkoff v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1941) 120 F. (2d) 564; Anheuser-Busch,
Inc. v. Helvering, (8th Cir. 1940) 115 F. (2d) 662; Pickard v. Commissioner, (2d Cir.
1940) 113 F. (2d) 488; Von's Investment Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1940) 111
F. (2d) 440; Commissioner v. Kolb, (9th Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 920; Electrical Securities
Corp. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 593; Commissioner v. Freund, (3d Cir.
1938) 98 F. (2d) 201; Lea v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 55; Helvering v.
Elkhorn Coal Co., ( 4th Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 732; North Jersey Title Insurance Co. v.
Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 898; Ballwood Co. v. Commissioner, (3d Cir.
1936) 84 F. (2d) 733; Helvering v. Winston Bros. Co., (8th Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 381;
O'Meara v. Commissioner, (10th Cir. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 390; Central Cuba Sugar Co.,
16 T.C. 882 (1951); Cedar Valley Distillery, 16 T.C. 870 (1951); Rufus Riddlesbarger,
16 T.C. 820 (1951); Estate of Lewis B. Meyer, 15 T.C. 850 (1950); Standard Envelope
Mfg. Co., 15 T.C. 41 (1950); Granberg Equipment, Inc., 11 T.C. 704 (1948); Fred B.
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invoked in a considerable variety of tax avoidance devices: recapitalizations, 67 reorganizations, 68 personally controlled corporations,69 family partnerships,70 redirection of corporate earnings through partnerships,71 corporate distributions,72 gifts to members of the family, 73 and
liquidations. 74
Snite, 10 T.C. 523 (1948); Crown Cork International Corp., 4 T.C. 19 (1944); William
C. Hay, 2 T.C. 460 (1943). The doctrine is not thought to apply in all cases. See, for
example, Commissioner v. H. W. Porter Co., (3d Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 939; Hirsch v.
Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1941) 124 F. (2d) 24. See also Differential Steel Car Co., 16
T.C. 413 (1951).
67 Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 67 S.Ct. 1489 (1947); Heady v. Commissoner, (7th Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 699; Estate of Lewis B. Meyer, 15 T.C. 850 (1950);
Clyde Bacon, Inc., 4 T.C. 1107 (1945); Louis Wellhouse, Jr., 3 T.C. 363 (1944).
68 Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 58 S.Ct. 393 (1938); Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S.Ct. 266 (1935); Survaunt v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1947)
162 F. (2d) 753; Stem v. Harrison, (7th Cir. 1945) 152 F. (2d) 321; Commissioner v.
Gilmore's Estate, (3d Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 791; Lyon, Inc. v. Commissioner, (6th Cir.
1942) 127 F. (2d) 210; Louis W. Gunby, Inc. v. Commissioner, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 122
F. (2d) 203; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Helvering, (8th Cir. 1940) 115 F. (2d) 662;
Pickard v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 488; Commissioner v. Freund, (3d
Cir. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 201; Lea v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 55; Helvering
v. Elkhorn Coal Co., (4th Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 732; Ballwood Co. v. Commissioner, (3d
Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 733; Standard Realization Co., 10 T.C. 708 (1948). Incidentally,
it may be noted in these cases that no distinction obtains between shareholder and corporation purpose. See Lewis v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 646, and cases cited.·
69 Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 60 S.Ct. 355 (1940); Commissioner v. Greenspun,
(5th Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 917; Tower v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d)
388; Palace Theatre v. United States, (7th Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 30; North Jersey Title
Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 898; Estate of L. B. Whitfield,
14 T.C. 776 (1950); Louis Adler Realty Co., 6 T.C. 778 (1946); Thomas K. Glenn, 3
T.C. 328 (1944); William C. Hay, 2 T.C. 460 (1943).
10 United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U.S. 451, 70 S.Ct. 280
(1950); Goodman v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1953) 200 F. (2d) 681; Toor v. Westover,
(9th Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 713; Roughan v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d)
253; Settos v. United States, (7th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 521; Kasper v. Baron, (8th Cir.
1951) 191 F. (2d) 737; Jones v. Baker, (10th Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 842; Kocin v. United
States, (2d Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 707; Collamer v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1950) 185
F. (2d) 146; Tinkoff v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1941) 120 F. (2d) 564; John P. Denison,
11 T.C. 686 (1948); Paul G. Greene, 7 T.C. 142 (1946); Davis B. Thornton, 5 T.C. 116
(1945); Camie! Thorrez, 5 T.C. 60 (1945).
71 John L. Denning Co. v. Commissioner, (10th Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 288; Cedar
Valley Distillery, 16 T.C. 870 (1951). See also Central Cuba Sugar Co., 16 T.C. 882
(1951); 58th Street Plaza Theatre, 16 T.C. 469 (1951); Ingle Coal Corp., 10 T.C. 1199
(1948).
72Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 67 S.Ct. 1489 (1947); 58th St. Plaza
Theatre v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 724; United States v. Lynch, (9th
Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 718; Commissioner v. Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., (2d
Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 570; Joseph W. Imler, 11 T.C. 836 (1948); Edward L. Kraus,
Jr., 6 T.C. 105 (1946). Compare Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., 9 T.C. 247 (1947).
78 Gouldman v. Commissioner, ( 4th Cir. 1948) 165 F. (2d) 686; Commissioner v.
GreenspJin, (5th Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 917; Hash v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1945)
152 F. (2d) 722.
74 Commissioner v. Webster's Estate, (5th Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 426; Helvering v.
Winston Bros. Co., (8th Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 381.
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In theory, the doctrine is rationalized as an aid to statutory construction: the language of the statute is interpreted in the light of the
meaning intended to be put upon it by Congress, which in turn intended the statute to be applicable only to transactions which were
entered into with a business purpose.75 Of course, under such an interpretation, the affinity of this rule to decision by invective76 is manifest.
For example, a device is said to be a "sham"; it is a sham because it was
not designed to serve a business purpose; and it is stricken down notwithstanding compliance with the formal terms of the statute because
it was not the intention of Congress to permit tax reduction through
shams. The doctrine is likewise akin to the principle that tax avoidance
is detected by ascertaining whether there was an intention which "defeats or contradicts the apparent transaction." 77 That doctrine might
be combined in practice with the business purpose rule by concluding
that if a taxpayer pretends to one purpose (business) but actually has
another (tax saving) the transaction will be ignored for tax purposes.
The sentiment expressed in this doctrine is appealing: if a transaction
is arranged for business purposes, tax consequences should be recognized; when it is established for tax saving purposes, it should be
ignored.
However, a critical problem in application of the rule arises when
both a business and tax saving purpose is manifest. In every case where
a taxpayer contemplates a substantial transaction he will assuredly
consider the tax, as well as business consequences. Consequently, this
issue recurs with great frequency. Leaving to one side the cases holding that any tax saving device will be effective if the parties are actually
bound,78 the cases dealing with this aspect of the business purpose
rule are very few indeed, and the Supreme Court has ignored it completely. Some of the cases that have dealt with the problem appear to
have considered-as is proper-that the device will be frustrated if tax
saving is the primary and business objectives are the secondary purposes
of the transaction.79 Others have implied that if a business purpose
75 For discussion of the general theory that courts are simply ascertaining legislative
intention, see infra notes 99 to 100 and text.
76 See notes 8 to 16 supra and text.
77 See notes 34 to 37 supra and text.
78 See notes 57 to 60 supra and text.
79 Meurer Steel Barrel Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 282
at 284: "The arrangement was perhaps too elaborate. From start to finish, as the Tax Court
found, there is substantial indication of a unified operation which had as its goal the sale of
petitioner's assets free from the taxes which would ordinarily arise. The Tax Court, on the
facts before it, had ample reason for deciding that from the time Jones secured his option
designed to acquire the assets and good will of the taxpayer, directly or indirectly, the
transaction proceeded with that end in view. As it advanced, the other objective, namely,
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is anywhere apparent, the tax saving scheme will be effective. 80 This
problem accentuates the basic deficiency in the doctrine: only the
most unimaginative of tax counsel will find it difficult to project innumerable business reasons supporting any device to save taxes.
Another problem of theory may be noted. The courts have repeated
to the point of boredom that an intention to save taxes is immaterial
in measuring the tax consequences of any transaction. However (to
restate the business purpose rule) it is equally well established that an
intention to consummate a transaction for purposes other than business
does govern tax liability. Actually there are only two purposes which
are pertinent in these cases: if the courts find that no business purpose
exists, the clear corollary is th~t the sole purpose of the taxpayer was
to save taxes. Then the intention of the taxpayer t~ save taxes clearly
becomes material, for it is abundantly clear that a tax saving purpose
alone is not a business purpose. 81 On the other hand, where a transaction is consummated partly with a view to saving taxes, and partly for
business reasons, there is no necessary conflict between the business
purpose rule and the view that a tax saving purpose is immaterial; as
has been noted, some courts have reconciled the views by holding that
where both purposes are present the existence of a tax saving intention
does not contaminate.82
Leaving the question of theory to one side, grave problems of consistency in applying the doctrine appear. It is clearly a doctrine of last
resort, invoked only where no more concrete and measurable principle
is available to lend respectability to the decision of the court. Like
other rules, it is invoked when it suits the pleasure of the court to decide
that of avoiding taxes on the profit arising out of the contemplated disposal of the assets,
became the more clearly defined, the more it was formally concealed behind the mechanics
of the disposal of the corporation to the partnership and the continuance of the latter in
business for two weeks, with the assets then turned over to Rheem Co." See also Commissioner v. Smith, (2d Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 556.
·
so See Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 60 S.Ct. 355 (1940), referring to a transaction
"solely to reduce tax liability"; see also Commissioner v. Webster's Estate, (5th Cir. 1942)
131 F. (2d) 426.
81 National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 69 S.Ct. 726 (1949);
Commissioner v. Smith, (2d Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 556 at 559: "But in the case at bar
we need go no farther than to say that there was no substantial business reason for the
creation or continued existence of Innisfail since its only, or at least, its main object was to
furnish the owner of all its stock with a means of diminishing his taxes." Electrical Securities Corp v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 593 at 595: "The avoidance or
suspension of taxes is not a business." The Tax Court is in accord: Rufus Riddlesbarger,
16 T.C. 820 (1951); William C. Hay, 2 T.C. 460 (1943). Compare Adam A. Adams,
5 T.C. 351 (1945) (dissent); W. P. Hobby, 2 T.C. 980 (1943); P.O'B. Montgomery, 1
T.C. 1000 (1943). But compare Bratton v. Commissioner, (10th Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d)
416.
82 See notes 79 to 80 supra.
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for the Commissioner, and is ignored in cases when recognition would
be embarrassing. In this area, no less than others in the law, courts
occasionally find it more convenient to ignore than to distinguish precedents. Consider, for example, the Cumberland case,83 in which the
taxpayers obviously set up a transaction in such a fashion as to avoid
a tax under the doctrine later adopted in the Court Holding Company
case. 84 The trial court found that the method by which certain properties
were disposed of was avowedly chosen in order to reduce taxes; and the
transaction was consummated by a series of steps, some of which had no
function other than to insulate against tax liability. The Commissioner's argument that tax should be imposed in these circumstances
was rejected by the trial court, and the Supreme Court accorded finality
to that decision. Yet on the basis of earlier cases it seems abundantly
clear that the manner in which the transaction was consummated involved "no business or corporate purpose,"85 that ''<:;scaping taxation is
not a business activity,"86 that "the whole arrangement took this form
instead of an outright distribution of cash ... because the latter would
undoubtedly have been taxable income [to the corporation],"87 that
there should be "disregard of a transfer of assets without a business
purpose but solely to reduce tax liability,"88 and that "a given result at
the end of a straight path is not a different result because reached by
following a devious path."80
A brief glance at other Supreme Court decisions during the past
five years emphasizes the point. In the Culbertson case, for example,
the decision was expressed only partially in terms of business purpose
and was based primarily on the even more amorphous concept that the
partnership arrangement must be "real," and "in good faith." 90 This,
of course, is a retreat toward absolute anarchy in the decisions. The doctrine was ignored in the Phipps case,91 in which business purpose was
not shown to be lacking but the Court imposed a tax in an exceptionally
obscure opinion. In the Bazley case, however, the doctrine was used in a
most vigorous form: there the case apparently turned on the joint judicial
conclusion that business purpose was absent and a tax saving purpose
United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U.S. 451, 70 S.Ct. 280 (1950).
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 65 S.Ct. 707 (1945).
85 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S.Ct. 266 (1935).
86 National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 69 S.Ct. 726 (1949).
87Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 67 S.Ct. 1489 (1947).
88 Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 60 S.Ct. 355 (1940).
80 Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 58 S.Ct. 393 (1938).
oo Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 69 S.Ct. 1210 (1949). The result in
the case was changed by amendment to the Internal Revenue Code in 1951. See I.R.C.,
§§191 and 3797(a)(2).
01 Commissioner v. Phipps, 336 U.S. 410, 69 S.Ct. 616 (1949).
83

84
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was present. 92 The cases thus demonstrate that-even if a cohesive
doctrine of business purpose could be developed as a matter of theory
-the scope of the practical application of business purpose rule has
been and now is thoroughly unpredictable. In summary, the business
purpose doctrine appears too evanescent to be helpful. Differences in
result frequently arise to the extent that various courts emphasize or
ignore either the business or tax avoidance purposes respectively
advanced by the taxpayer and the Commissioner. The effect of the
doctrine where both business and tax saving motives are present has
not been definitively stated. Finally and most important, the application of the doctrine is whimsical; it is invoked when thought desirable
and ignored when it is inconvenient.
The Step Transaction Rule. Another rule frequently mentioned
is the so-called "step transaction" doctrine. The problem here at first
appears to be of narrow compass: when several steps are taken in a
transaction is the effect of the entire transaction to be considered, or
should the transaction be broken down into its separate parts? Speaking in general terms it would seem that if a transaction has a business
purpose but is consummated by a number of unnecessary steps in order
to minimize taxes which would otherwise arise, this doctrine will be
invoked. Thus, in the Court Holding case a corporation sought to sell
its assets, and the stockholders by successive steps liquidated the corporation, distributed the assets, and sold to the persons who originally
negotiated for purchase from the corporation. The purpose and effect
of the series was to avoid imposition of income tax on the corporation,
and the Court taxed the income from the sale to the corporation as
though it had in fact made the sale. 93 The earlier cases have been
collected and the conclusion reached that the several transactions should
be treated as one where, on an objective view of what took place, they
could be said to be interdependent. The enterprise under that doctrine
is to interpret the objective facts of a series of transactions so as to
ascertain whether the legal relations created by one in the series would
have been fruitless without a completion of the series. 94 Here, as in
the business purpose rule, subsidiary principles have been freely articulated. It has been said, for example, that the transaction must be
Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 67 S.Ct. 1489 (1947).
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 65 S.Ct. 707 (1945).
94 See PAUL, SELECTED STIJDms IN FEDERAL TAXATION (Second Series) 200-253
(1938). This view has been followed by the courts. See, for example, ACF-Brill Motors
Co. v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 704; American Wire Fabrics Corp., 16
T.C. 607 (1951); Ruth M. Cullen, 14 T.C. 368 (1950); Helen C. Brown, 12 T.C. 1095
(1949); Westfir Lumber Co., 7 T.C. 1014 (1946); Illinois Water Service Co., 2 T.C.
1200 (1943). Compare Hatch's Estate v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 26.
92

93
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viewed as a whole95 and that no segregation of steps is appropriate
where all are taken pursuant to a unitary plan96 or are integrated parts
of a single scheme. 97 Likewise, a single transaction cannot be broken
up into various elements to avoid a tax. 98
It requires little penetration to conclude that under this doctrine,
as with others, prediction is difficult to the point of impossibility. The
success of the tax saving enterprise is measured by the intention of the
taxpayer-whether he intended one transaction or separate transactions-and the intention must be ascertained from objective evidence.
Since the objective evidence (facts) in each case will be different,
and no patterns appear to be emerging under the doctrine, its significance appears dubious.
The Search for Legislative Intention. Sometimes when courts are
faced with a new and wondrous mechanism by which the ever hopeful
taxpayer seeks to insure tax savings, they prudently retire behind the
statement that the statute was not intended to authorize the result
sought by the taxpayer. In the entire cabinet of bromides for use on
such occasions, there is none to cause the analytical taxpayer more
95 Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 at 334, 65 S.Ct. 707 (1945):
''The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction. The tax consequences which arise from gains from a sale of property are not finally to be determined
solely by the means employed to transfer legal title. Rather, the transaction must be viewed
as a whole, and each step, from the commencement of negotiations to the consummation of
the sale, is relevant. A sale by one person cannot be transformed for tax purposes into a
sale by another by using the latter as a conduit through which to pass title." See also,
Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 61 S.Ct. 646 (1941); Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 58 S.Ct. 393 (1938); Budd International Corp. v. Commissioner, (3d
Cir. 1944) 143 F. (2d) 784; Heberlein Patent Corp. v. United States, (2d Cir. 1939)
105 F. (2d) 965; Hazeltine Corp. v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 513;
Thurber v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 815; Halliburton v. Commissioner,
(9th Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 265. In Tennessee, Alabama & Georgia Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 826, the same statement was made in a decision which
distinguished an earlier case on most dubious grounds. See also, May Dept. Stores Co., 16
T.C. 547 (1951); Tennessee, Alabama & Georgia Ry. Co., 13 T.C. 486 (1949); Independent Oil Co., Inc., 6 T.C. 194 (1946); Frederick R. Horne, 5 T.C. 250 (1945); Jacob
DeKorse, 5 T.C. 94 (1945); Clyde Bacon, Inc., 4 T.C. 1107 (1945).
9 6 United States v. Gendron Wheel Co., (6th Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 57; Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., (6th Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 588; National Bank of
Commerce in Memphis v. United States, (D.C. Tenn. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 302; Grace Bros.,
Inc., 10 T.C. 158 (1948); Clyde Bacon, Inc., 4 T.C. 1107 (1945).
97 Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 62 S.Ct. 540 (1942);
American Wire Fabric Corp., 16 T.C. 607 (1951); Shaffer Terminals, Inc., 16 T.C. 356
(1951); Catherine G. Armston, 12 T.C. 539 (1949); Richard K. Mellon, 12 T.C. 90
(1949); Ingle Coal Corp., 10 T.C. 1199 (1948); Koppers Coal Co., 6 T.C. 1209 (1946);
Isabella M. Sheldon, 6 T.C. 510 (1946); Globe-News Publishing Co., 3 T.C. 1199
(1944); Illinois Water Service Co., 2 T.C. 1200 (1943). To the same effect, see Lewis v.
Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 646; United Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 866.
98Buhl v. Kavanagh, (6th Cir. 1941) 118 F. (2d) 315; Starr v. Commissioner, (4th
Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 964; Koppers Coal Co., 6 T.C. 1209 (1946). Compare Conrad N.
Hilton, 13 T.C. 623 (1949); Walter S. Heller, 2 T.C. 371 (1943).
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anguish. These references go beyond recourse to traditional legislative
materials; in many cases the congressional debates and committee
reports are silent on the subject. Rather, what is here involved is the
view expressed in the Gregory case and others99 that Congress did not
intend a purely formal compliance with statutory requirements to be
effective in avoiding a tax. We are not vouchsafed an explanation
of how the Court arrived at the conclusion that Congress intended the
statute to be read in a manner other than it was written, and no
extrinsic evidence on that subject is available. Accordingly, it may
not be unkind to entertain the thought that when the Supreme Court
says Congress did not intend to permit tax avoidance, it really means
only that the Court refuses to permit it. This brings us once again to
that most baffling of all questions: upon what basis does the Supreme
Court distinguish the cases in which a wholly literal compliance with
statutory terms will be effective to save taxes, from those in which such
tax saving is frustrated? 100
99 This concept has been variously stated, with the inevitable cloudiness of expression.
Some courts have said that the question for determination is whether what was done, apart
from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute intended. Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 465 at 469, 55 S.Ct. 266 (1935); Commissioner v. Riggs, (3d Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d)
1004; Commissioner v. Dyer, (2d Cir. 1935) 74 F. (2d) 685; Labrot v. Burnet, (D.C. Cir.
1932) 57 F. (2d) 413. Others have said that the statute "is not to be read literally,"
LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 60 S.Ct. 313 (1940), or the effort is to "seek out the
true intendment of the law," Lewis v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 646,
or the statute "does not permit" the desired result, Limericks, Inc. v. Commissioner, (5th
Cir. 1948) 165 F. (2d) 483, and must be read "in the light of its own purpose," Fairfield
S. S. CorP. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1946) 157 F. (2d) 321, "or the intention of its
makers," Pembroke Realty & Securities CorP. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d)
252. Moreover, "we need more than a dictionary" to understand the terms of a statute,
Electrical Securities CorP. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 593. For other
comments, see Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 61 S.Ct. 646 (1941); Foster v.
United States, 303 U.S. 118, 58 S.Ct. 424 (1938); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v.
Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 53 S.Ct. 259 (1933); Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247
U.S. 330, 38 S.Ct. 540 (1918); John A. Nelson Co. v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1935) 75
F. (2d) 696; Estate of Hill, 10 T.C. 1090 (1948); Estate of John B. Lewis, 10 T.C. 1080
(1948); Carlton B. Overton, 6 T.C. 304 (1946); Crown Cork International CorP., 4 T.C.
19 (1944). Of course, these cases do not involve the very frequent situation where interPretation of the terms of the statute is actually in issue. The statute was clear in the
cited cases, but the court concluded that its effect was altered by a tax avoidance purpose
manifested in an artificial transaction.
Compare Floyd v. Scofield, (5th Cir. 1952) 193 F. (2d) 594; Masonite CorP. v. Fly,
(5th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 257 at 260: "The intention of the legislature with respect to
tax statutes must ••• be ascertained from the language of the act. • . • The literal meaning
of the words employed in tax statutes is most important••••" Allen v. Atlanta Metallic
Casket Co., (5th Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 460; Riddlesbarger v. Commissioner, (7th Cir.
1952) 200 F. (2d) 165.
100 Another and completely subsidiary principle in the general field of tax avoidance
is the view that tax avoidance may be made successful if only enough time is taken to
accomplish the objective. This view is, of course, encouraged by the comment in the
Gregory decision that the corPorate entity which was there ignored was put to death immediately after its tax saving function had been discharged. The view has since been supplemented in several cases in which tax saving devices were rejected. In John Kelley Co.
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Summary

The object of this article has been to :6.nd whether a measurable
pattern runs through the tax avoidance decisions and, to the extent
that any pattern exists, to determine its form and scope. The various
doctrines used in the tax avoidance cases have been separately examined. We have found that views clash and stratify; they do not
merge in cold gradation and well balanced form. It now becomes
necessary to examine the joint effect of all of them. Before doing so,
a brief review of the problem is appropriate.
The nature of the taxation process requires that statutes be drafted
so as to establish only the broad outlines of revenue responsibility.
Frequently, this impels taxpayers to engage in commercially astonishing transactions which would result in, tax savings under literal interpretation of the statute. In measuring the tax consequences of such
conduct, courts must weigh the dangers of successful tax avoidance
against the perils of imposing tax responsibility by judicial fiat in cases
where no such responsibility is imposed by statute. The issue explored
is both where and how the line is to be drawn.
In terms of this objective, the comments of the courts and the
doctrines they have enunciated are discouraging. It is all very well to
call a transaction a sham, but one undertaking to predict the outcome
of litigation might find it comforting to be informed of the difference
between "sham" and "non-sham." And while all may agree that form
must not be exalted over substance, one may properly be concerned at
the failure of the courts to establish the point at which form ends and
substance begins. Similarly, it is hardly open to doubt that transactions which are not "realistic," or "bona fide," should be ignored; but
that does not inform us how or where the line between the purity and
unrighteousness should be traced. Finally, when a court rejects a tax
saving device by looking to the intention of Congress in enacting the
statute, that case has no value of any kind in predicting the treatment of
v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 at 525, 66 S.Ct. 299 (1946), it was said: "There is not
present in either situation the wholly useless temporary compliance with statutory literalness which this Court condemned as futile, as a matter of law, in Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465." See also Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179 at
184-185, 62 S.Ct. 540 (1942): "Transitory phases of an arrangement frequently are disregarded under these sections of the revenue acts where they add nothing of substance to
the completed affair." Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454 at 458, 58 S.Ct. 307 (1938):
"Any direct ownership by Atlas of Peerless, Black Diamond, and Union was transitory and
without real substance; it was part of a plan which contemplated the immediate transfer of
the stock or the assets or both of the three reorganized companies to the new Atlas subsidiary." And see, Lewis v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 646, and de Goldschmidt-Rothschild v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 975. Tax Court decisions demonstrate the same approach. See, Estate of Lewis B. Meyer, 15 T.C. 850 (1950);
Frederick R. Home, 5 T.C. 250 (1945); Clara M. Tully Trust, 1 T.C. 611 (1943).
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a different tax saving device in the future. Standards of "policy" and
"congressional intention" are altogether intuitive.
,
The series of decisions which recite that a taxpayer may reduce
his taxes by any legal means can hardly be applauded when no dividing
line between. legal and illegal means is suggested; and the line of cases
holding that tax saving transactions must be given effect if the parties
to them are actually bound ignores the multitude of cases in which
just such devices were stricken down for tax purposes. The perfunctory observation that a tax saving motive is immaterial is altogether
inaccurate in fact, as the cited cases demonstrate. Equally overstated,
at the other extreme, is the principle occasionally expressed that tax
avoidance devices will be stricken down simply because they impair
the public fisc.
This leaves us with two rules which purport to have substance.
One is that transactions are effective in obtaining tax savings only
where a business purpose is present. The second is the step transaction
doctrine, in which the effectiveness of the tax saving device depends on
whether the legal relations created in one step would have been fruitless without the completion of the series, the question of fruitfulness
turning on what was intended. Thus, basically, intention is the touchstone in each doctrine.
As a practical matter, these rules leave much to be desired. It
has been noted that they have been applied in a whimsical manner.
In addition, there is ample authority for saying that when the trial court
ascertains "intention" it determines the existence of a "fact." Certainly
that is so if we adopt the view once cynically expressed that a question
of fact is a hard question of law. Hence, review of such decisions is
likely to be sharply limited. It was certainly so limited under the
Dobson rule. 101 While that rule was later rejected by congressional
101 Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 at 502, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943): ''Whether
an apparently integrated transaction shall be broken up into several separate steps and
whether what apparently are several steps shall be synthesized into one whole transaction
is frequently a necessary determination in deciding tax consequences. Where no statute or
regulation controls, the Tax Court's selection of the course to follow is no more reviewable
than any other question of fact." The view was frequently reiterated. See, for example,
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 at 333-334, 65 S.Ct. 707 (1945): "The
Tax Court concluded from these facts that, despite the declaration of a 'liquidating dividend' followed by the transfers of legal title, the corporation had not abandoned the sales
negotiations; that these were mere formalities designed 'to make the transaction appear to
be other than what it was' in order to avoid tax liability•••• There was evidence to support
the findings of the Tax Court, and its findings must therefore be accepted by the courts."
See also, Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 68 S.Ct. 715 (1948); Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 67 S.Ct. 1489 (1947); de Goldschmidt-Rothschild v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 975; Limericks, Inc. v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1948)
165 F. (2d) 483; Mauldin v. Commissioner, '(4th Cir. 1946) 155 F. (2d) 666; Okouite
Co. v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1946) 155 F. (2d) 248; Helvering v. Ward, (8th Cir.
1935) 79 F. (2d) 381.
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action,1° 2 it is nevertheless clear that whether a transaction is genuine
or a sham is a question of fact, even under the congressional amendment.103 The shades of distinction, if any, between the epithet
approach, the business purpose rule and the step transaction doctrine
lends support to the belief that trial court determinations under any
of these views would be largely immune to appellate review and hence
that general rules will be slow to emerge in this area.
This raises the question of whether we have not been barking up
the wrong tree in trying to formulate general principles respecting tax
avoidance devices. The difficulty in such formulation is easily illustrated. Presumably most people would agree that a person who holds
property over six months with the intention of taking advantage of long
term capital gain allowance should be successful in saving taxes. Most
would also agree that at least some attempts at tax minimizing through
corporate distributions should be frustr8:~ed. Yet the sad and simple
fact is that there is no logically defensible rationale of tax avoidance
which will encompass both conclusions. The major premises under
which tax avoidance is frustrated in some cases and allowed in others
are simply too ephemeral to be articulated. And if articulation were
possible, it would only serve to challenge further the ingenuity of the
taxpayer.
To approach the problem sanely we must do two things. We must
first remember that justification for preventing tax avoidance is
rational and legitimate: the need for protection of the federal revenues
by preservation of public confidence in our system of taxation. To
measure the length to which a court will go, we must stop reaching
for the easy, general rule expressed in terms of business purpose or step
transactions and devote our energies to charting what the courts have
done in fact.
102 I.R.C.,

§1141, as amended by 62 Stat. L. 869 (1948).
was so held in United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U.S. 451
at 454, 70 S.Ct. 280 (1950). The Court also stated with respect to the sham transaction
problem (p. 456): "It is for the trial court, upon consideration of an entire transaction, to
determine the factual category in which a particular transaction belongs." Of similar import
are Lewis v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 646, and Kohl v. Commissioner,
(8th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 531, decided after the amendment of I.R.C., §1141. Under
the amendment and Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure even a finding of
fact is reviewable if it is "clearly erroneous," but within the doctrine of the foregoing cases
it is assumed that appellate courts will be most reluctant to so characterize the conclusions
of the trial tribunal. Other recent cases include Toor v. Westover, (9th Cir. 1952) 200 F.
(2d) 713; Goodman v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1953) 200 F. (2d) 681; Roughan v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 253; Settos v. United States, (7th Cir. 1951) 192
F. (2d) 521; Kasper v. Baron, (8th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 737; Barrett v. Commissioner,
(1st Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 150; Nelson v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d)
649.
10a It

1052

MmmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 51

Areas are frequent in which successions of cases have occurred in
sufficient volume to establish patterns which furnish a basis for
reasonable prediction of the outcome of similar cases which may arise
in the future. 104 Without attempting an exhaustive assembly of the
cases, it is clear that such principles include such major doctrines as
those establishing that reallocation of income within a family group will
not shift the incidence of income tax liability,1°5 nor will transactions
which do not vary the actual command of income106 or the property
taxed.107 Similarly, in reorganization cases the decisions require a continuity of interest,1° 8 while profits are said to carry over in cases of
merger and liquidation but deficits do not.109 In still another field,
decisions respecting the circumstances under which a corporate entity
will be disregarded have created a reasonably stable and dependable ·
body of principles.110 The cases dealing with sale and leaseback
arrangements have already been noted.111 As tax saving devices recur
in the same general form, legal principles will emerge. In this sense,
"law" is being made, and prediction becomes increasingly accurate
under the judicial processes of inclusion and exclusion. The prospect
does not entirely please, but we may console ourselves that our blindnesses and uncertainties are only those which fall to all of us seeking
"the solid land of fixed and settled rules."
104 Space forbids discussion of the process by which such a succession of cases ( which
singly might be said each to involve only a question of fact) in totality defines a principle
of law. The matter is discussed in Rice, ''Law, Fact, and Taxes: Review of Tax Court
Decisions under Section 1141 of the Internal Revenue Code," 51 CoL. L. REv. 439 (1951).
105 See, for example, Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 68 S.Ct. 715 (1948);
Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 66 S.Ct. 532 (1946); Harrison v. Schaffner, 312
U.S. 579, 61 S.Ct. 759 (1941).
100 Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 60 S.Ct. 355 (1940); Wickwire v. United
States, (6th Cir. 1941) 116 F. (2d) 679; Shaffer Terminals, Inc., 16 T.C. 44 (1951);
Paul G. Greene, 7 T.C. 142 (1946).
107 Ingle v. Mc Gowan, (2d Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 785; Continental Oil Co. v.
Jones, (10th Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 557. See also such cases as Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.S. 331, 60 S.Ct. 554 (1940) and Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 50 S.Ct. 336
(1930).
108 The leading cases on this doctrine include LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 60
S.Ct. 313 (1940); Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 at 385, 56 S.Ct. 269
(1935), and Pinellas Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 53 S.Ct.
257 (1933).
109 Commissioner v. Phipps, 336 U.S. 410, 69 S.Ct. 616 (1949); Commissioner v.
Sansome, (2d Cir. 1932) 60 F. (2d) 931.
110 See, for example, Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 63 S.Ct.
1132 (1943), and cases cited. Compare Advance Machinery Exchange v. Commissioner,
(2d Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 1006; and see American Range Lines v. Commissioner, (2d
Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 844.
111 See, e.g., May Dept. Stores Co., 16 T.C. 547 (1951); Shaffer Terminals, Inc., 16
T.C. 356 (1951); Standard Envelope Mfg. Co., 16 T.C. 41 (1950); Helen C. Brown, 12
T.C. 1095 (1949); Catherine G. Armston, 12 T.C. 539 (1949); Ingle Coal Corp., 10 T.C.
1199 (1948); Buffalo Meter Co., 10 T.C. 83 (1948).

